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Abstract 
The article uses agenda-setting to analyse the process which saw sport included in the new EU 
programme, Erasmus+, despite cuts in the EU’s budget. In doing so, the article addresses gaps in two 
bodies of literature. On the one hand, it contributes to developing the study of EU agenda-setting. 
On the other hand, the article analyses recent developments in EU sport policy, a body of literature 
that has not paid attention yet to decisions taken after the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon 
(2009). The article applies conceptually guided process tracing through written documents and 25 
semi-structured interviews with representatives from the European Commission, European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union. The analysis shows how the Commission 
overcame blockades by framing sport initiatives as part of the wider agenda on economic growth 
through education, training and participation in grassroots sport, thus obtaining a funding stream for 
a new policy area in a time of austerity measures. The research illustrates that agenda-setting is a 
useful conceptual framework for explaining not just radical but also incremental policy changes on 
the EU agenda. 
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The Lisbon Treaty marks an important milestone for European Union (EU) sport policy. The EU, for 
the first time, was given direct competence on sport allowing EU institutions to develop a formal 
sport policy with a dedicated budget line (García and Weatherill 2012). However, despite having a 
legal basis in the field of sport, it was challenging for the European Commission’s Directorate 
General for Education and Culture (DG EAC) - responsible for sport - to secure a budget line for the 
implementation of its initiatives under EU sport policy. The Erasmus+ Programme was finally chosen 
as the vehicle to facilitate the development of a European sport policy, hence becoming the 2014-
2020 EU programme for education, training, youth, and sport (European Parliament and Council of 
the European Union 2013, emphasis added). With Erasmus+, sport for the first time received a 
dedicated funding stream as part of the EU’s 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), 
colloquially known as the EU budget.  
This paper adopts the theoretical lens of agenda-setting to explore the process that led to the 
adoption of the Erasmus+ sports chapter. While agenda-setting has been used extensively to study 
policymaking dynamics at national level (Baumgartner, Green-Pedersen and Jones 2006), it has only 
recently been employed to study EU decisions, and the academic literature which applies agenda-
setting to policy making at the European level is in ‘its relative infancy’ (Stephenson 2012: 796). 
Therefore, the article represents a contribution to the growing academic work on that area (Princen 
and Rhinard 2006; Princen 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013; Moschella 2011; Littoz-Monnet 2012; 
Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013). In this regard, we use EU sport policy as a case study to help 
refine the existing literature that has developed theoretically the study of EU agenda-setting 
(Princen 2007, 2009, 2013).  
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Thus, the first research objective of the article is to analyse the process that led to the adoption of 
the Erasmus+ sports chapter as part of the development within EU’s sport policy agenda. The article 
is not interested in the process that led to sport being initially introduced onto the EU policy agenda 
and incorporated in the treaties; this has been done at length elsewhere (see, for example, García 
and Weatherill 2012). The article additionally analyses the agenda-setting dynamics of an existing 
policy, i.e. sport. Building on the existing literature on EU agenda-setting (reviewed below) the 
second objective of the article is to discuss the role of issue framing and institutional constraints in 
EU agenda-setting. Thus, the article presents the case study of EU sport policy in order to contribute 
to the ongoing development of EU agenda-setting theory.  
Our findings particularly illustrate the way institutional factors constrain the attention of EU policy 
actors, namely the Council of the European Union (we will refer to this institution also as the Council 
for stylistic reasons) and the European Parliament (EP); and how the strategic framing of sport by DG 
EAC recaptured their interest. Theoretically, these findings underline the importance of issue 
framing and its strategic use to overcome institutional constraints and the lack of attention from 
policy actors. The article proceeds in four steps. First, the literature on EU agenda-setting is 
reviewed. Second, the specific details of our methodology are outlined. Then, the process of sport’s 
inclusion in Erasmus+ is explained. Finally, we reflect on our findings and conclude with the 
implications for the wider understanding of EU agenda-setting.  
 
AGENDA-SETTING IN THE EU  
The concept of issue framing is at the heart of agenda-setting theory (Littoz-Monnet 2012). It refers 
to the way in which issues are defined while being incorporated onto the agenda (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993). It forms, together with issue initiation and issue specification, the core of agenda-
setting (Cobb and Elder 1972; Cobb, Ross and Ross 1976). For agenda-setters, the challenge to 
incorporating an issue onto the political agenda is capturing the attention of policymakers and 
building credibility (Princen 2011) so that their proposals are considered. Consequently, an issue is 
unlikely to get incorporated onto the agenda unless it is expanded to attract the attention of enough 
decision-makers (Cobb et al. 1976; Princen 2011). This is even more so the case in the EU, as issues 
may be lost in the process due to the EU’s multilevel governance system, which provides a 
multiplicity of venues for deliberation. Moreover, the complexity of the EU’s institutional structure, 
with power and competences diffused across institutions (Buonanno and Nugent 2013), offers actors 
the ability to set, modify and block the agenda at different points.  
Whereas the EU is defined as an ‘agenda-setting paradise’ (Peters 2001: 88), it is not that easy to get 
issues onto the political agenda because the multiple entry points to the policy process can be used 
by both those in favour or against. In the ordinary policymaking process of the EU, the European 
Commission acts as a main agenda-setter due to its right of legislative initiative. However, it needs to 
ensure that proposals expand from its technocratic internal services (‘the low politics route’) to ‘the 
high politics route’ involving the Council and the European Parliament (Princen and Rhinard 2006: 
1121) in order to have a realistic chance of being accepted onto the decision agenda. Here, in this 
process of expansion from the initial policy agenda to the decision agenda of the Council and the 
European Parliament, is where issue framing is crucial. Issue framing has the potential to influence 
the degree of support by decision makers for the issue at hand, hence facilitating (or not, depending 
on the framing) the entrance onto the decision agenda (Moschella 2011). Thus, issue framing is 
considered to be central to agenda-setting’s success (Littoz-Monnet 2012).  
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Agenda-setters, therefore, will use issue frames strategically in order to define them in a way to 
mobilise the attention of policy actors. Accordingly, Princen (2011) conceptualises a typology of 
strategies that are adopted by agenda-setting policy actors at the European level. Among those 
strategies, Princen defines the strategy that uses frames to increase the interest of decision-makers: 
‘arousing interest’ (Princen 2011: 933). The success of such a strategy depends on whether a 
convincing link is created between a policy problem and a prospective solution (Kingdon 1995; 
Princen 2007; Littoz-Monnet 2012). Framing, according to Princen (2011: 933) can be constructed 
either through ‘big words’ or through ‘small steps’. The former involves linking the issue with 
established overall values which are central to the EU’s identity, such as democracy and human 
rights (Princen 2011). By emphasising certain values, policy entrepreneurs seek to attract attention 
and attempt to induce policy actors to look at issues from their preferred perspective 
(Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013). Another closely related strategy to the use of big words is to 
connect the issue to the stated policy priorities and commitments of the EU. For example, Princen 
(2011) highlights that a wide variety of issues was presented as contributing to the so-called Lisbon 
Agenda for economic development and growth when it officially became a top priority in the EU. The 
strategic use of frames through broader-level concepts or context is also in line with the general 
studies on framing. These emphasise the importance of new frames referring to existing meta-
frames, whether being resonant with broader values or wider social concerns (Goldstein 1993; 
Schon and Rein 1994; Rhinard 2010).  
An alternative strategy to the use of big words is to generate interest in the issue through ‘small 
steps’ such as debates of the issue, organising conferences and focusing on its non-controversial 
elements (Princen 2011). Although the small steps approach is more time consuming, it makes use 
of a variety of instruments at the disposal of agenda-setters and gets operationalised if the link to 
the broader values or concerns cannot be convincingly established (Princen 2011). 
Beyond the strategic use of frames to gain attention, institutional constraints also significantly 
impact the agenda-setting process. Institutional constraints will dictate whether an issue can be 
considered or not, and the way in which it can be done. The institutional and political framework 
within which policy actors operate favours the consideration of some issues while hindering the 
consideration of others (Littoz-Monnet 2012). Thus, institutional constraints directly affect the 
possibilities for issue expansion in the agenda-setting process. The EU’s institutional framework is 
characterised by fragmented decision-making and a multilevel system of governance, which makes 
the EU very receptive to agenda-setters (Peters 1994, 2001; Peters and Pierre 2004). There is always 
at least one actor, whether a member state, a DG of the Commission or a committee of the 
European Parliament, that could be receptive to an issue. Nonetheless, this is a double-edged sword. 
Given the multiplicity of institutions and policy venues that are part of EU policymaking, issue 
expansion might become problematic for agenda-setters because they need to overcome a large 
number of procedural stages where EU institutions enjoy agenda-blocking powers that can delay or 
force change (i.e. reframing). Indeed, successful agenda-setting in the EU ‘requires a considerable 
degree of consensus among important actors about the need to address the issue’ (Princen 2007: 
33). In other words, whereas agenda-setting proposals might find a receptive EU policy venue/actor 
with relative ease, it is much more difficult to get the issue considered high enough on the political 
agenda because there are a large number of actors to get on board (Princen 2007).  
These specific institutional characteristics of the EU can be rather constraining for agenda setters 
and underline the stark contrast between the ease of achieving access to the wider policy agenda 
and the difficulty of actual policy adoption and implementation (Peters 2001). Therefore, it is 
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claimed that ‘the rise of issues on the political agenda depends on the availability of institutionally 
favourable conditions within the political system’ (Littoz-Monnet 2012: 507). 
Despite the growing academic interest that EU agenda-setting has attracted, the focus of the existing 
literature on issue framing and its strategic use is rather limited (Moschella 2011; Littoz-Monnet 
2012; Stephenson 2012; Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013). Furthermore, among this limited 
academic work, there is only one study that highlights the interplay between institutional constraints 
and issue framing in EU agenda-setting (Littoz-Monnet 2012). In her examination of EU cultural 
policy, Littoz-Monnet (2012) underlined the way in which DG EAC framed culture strategically as a 
potential solution to the EU’s economic problems by articulating its capacity to promote European 
growth and competitiveness. Littoz-Monnet, however, emphasised that such framing was only 
possible due to the power and salience of a pre-existing broader discursive framework: the 
establishment of the Lisbon Strategy under which the knowledge-based, competitive economy was 
the cornerstone of the EU’s economic strategy. In other words, the Lisbon Strategy created a 
broader institutional condition which could have been rather constraining but DG EAC managed to 
link its creativity frame successfully to the broader priorities of the strategy.  
As we have seen in this review, the academic literature argues that issue framing is at the heart of 
successful agenda-setting (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Princen, through his work on the 
application of agenda-setting concepts to the European Union, has formulated a typology of 
strategies that policy actors follow in order to set the agenda and manage to get their issues 
incorporated onto the EU decision agenda. A limited number of case studies (Moschella 2011; Littoz-
Monnet 2012; Stephenson 2012; Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013) have built on that work by 
exploring the strategic use of issue framing. Thus, this article represents the exploration of another 
case study (the adoption of the Erasmus+ sport chapter) to develop further the analysis of the 
relationship of issue framing and institutional constraints in EU agenda-setting. In doing so, we seek 
to refine the study of EU agenda-setters’ strategy and to contribute to the existing literature on EU 
agenda-setting.  
 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
A case study approach is employed because it is particularly suited to investigating processes over 
time (Yin 2014). The research approach adopted is inductive, as the article seeks to contribute to 
existing theoretical debates rather than to generate theories or hypotheses. More specifically, our 
research design represents a form of ‘case-centric process tracing’ where the main aim is explain a 
particularly puzzling outcome (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 11), in particular: how do we explain the 
novel inclusion of earmarked funds for sport through Erasmus+? Rather than outright ‘theory 
testing’, the agenda-setting framework elaborated above is used pragmatically: as a heuristic 
instrument with analytical utility in explaining our case (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 13). Thus, 
agenda-setting theory is used to identify the intervening processes (George and Bennett 2005: 206–
207). By submitting this case to careful process tracing and by presenting careful descriptions 
(Mahoney 2010: 125–131), however, the goal is also to evaluate this framework. Thus, while our aim 
is case-centric, we still draw some theoretical inferences.  
Since case study research collects evidence from a multitude of sources in order to arrive at relevant 
conclusions (Yin 2014), this research draws from both primary and secondary sources. Specifically, 
we rely on written sources and interviews with policymakers. As for the former, the article uses 
official documents from EU institutions. The interviews informing this research comprise a total of 
25 semi-structured interviews with officials involved in EU sport policy from the European 
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Commission, the European Parliament and the Council (see Table 1 appended to this article for 
interview details). These were undertaken face to face, except for two which had to be performed 
by telephone due to the interviewees’ agenda. Interviews typically lasted between one and two 
hours. The interview guide design was informed by the review of the written documents, as 
specified above. Among other topics, interviewees were particularly asked about how Erasmus+ 
came to be adopted. These interviews formed part of a larger study (see De Wolff 2016), but the 
data used for this article is only concerned with the context and the process that led to the adoption 
of Erasmus+.  
 
THE ADOPTION OF ERASMUS PLUS  
The article now moves to explore the adoption of the Erasmus+ sport chapter. For the sake of 
brevity, highly stylised facts of process tracing are presented here in chronological order. Our 
analysis is divided into two stages that highlight the dynamics of EU agenda-setting within which DG 
EAC successfully worked to get sport onto the EU financial policy agenda and the subsequent 
funding stream for sport policy.  
 
STAGE 1. THE TWO-YEAR EU SPORT PROGRAMME (2012-2013): FACING INSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRAINTS 
Following the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, DG EAC started in early 
2010 to develop suitable policy initiatives to implement the sport provisions in Art. 165 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The policy process involved a consultation 
exercise with all actors concerned, including inter-service dialogue with all connected Commission 
DGs and an informal ministerial meeting during the European Sport Forum in April 2010 (European 
Commission 2011a; 2011b). In line with the previous budget allocations via three annual work 
programmes (2009, 2010, 2011) adopted by the Commission for ‘the preparatory actions in the field 
of sport’ and ‘special annual events’ (European Commission 2011c: 9), DG EAC developed a proposal 
for a two-year Sport Programme (2012-2013) that had a limited spending scheme from the ongoing 
EU budget (European Commission 2011b).  
On 30th July 2010, DG EAC submitted the perceptive impact assessment report to the Commission’s 
Impact Assessment Board (IAB). For the purposes of funding, sport was linked in this proposal to the 
budget’s Citizenship section under the ‘Heading 3B’ (European Commission 2011b: 5). This budget 
heading aimed at addressing issues that generally concerned the interest of the EU citizens including 
some negative trends such as organised crime, terrorism and illegal immigration, but also fostering 
European culture and diversity (European Commission 2004). In this connection, according to DG 
EAC, sport as a policy field possesses socio-cultural values which can be utilised to ensure ‘the 
positive effects of sport are of greater benefit for EU citizens and for European society as a whole’ 
(European Commission 2011b: 7). This framing of the issue was consistent with DG EAC’s general 
belief system regarding EU sport policy, as this unit of the European Commission has been one of the 
main advocates of sport’s socio-cultural benefits over the last two decades (Parrish 2003).  
Different institutional constraints, nevertheless, prevented the proposed two-year programme even 
getting onto the decision agenda. Firstly, DG EAC was unable to mobilise internal support within the 
Commission, as the IAB sent it back on 3rd September 2010 for revision (European Commission 
2011b). The IAB particularly underlined the existence of different types of institutional constraints 
against the proposal and its specific funding requirement (European Commission 2011b). First, there 
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was a budgetary limitation at the European level. The mobilisation of additional financial resources 
for the programme as requested by DG EAC from the very limited remaining margins of the ongoing 
Financial Perspectives 2007-2013 was rather problematic. According to the IAB, a potentially very 
small financial allocation for the programme would have not been sufficient to achieve its envisaged 
policy objectives (European Commission 2011b). Second, an evaluation of the Preparatory Actions of 
2009 and 2010 had not been carried out yet, which meant that it was impossible to illustrate and 
justify the EU-added value of the proposed programme in an independent manner (European 
Commission 2011b). This was deemed to be the key substantial constraint against the proposal and 
its required funding scheme (interview, Commission official, 17 June 2014).  
Besides failing to gain internal support within the Commission, the proposed programme also failed 
to get the endorsement of European sport ministers. DG EAC’s idea was discussed at the Council 
meeting in May 2010 and the ministers did not explicitly endorse the creation of the two-year Sport 
Programme. They underlined EU action in the field of sport should have clear added value by 
comparison with national plans (Council of the European Union 2010). Therefore, in this regard, the 
lack of evaluation of the 2009 and 2010 Preparatory Actions to illustrate the added value of EU 
actions in the field of sport proved to be an issue for the Council as well. Furthermore, taking into 
account the limited potential funding that would be available for sport-related activities, the 
ministers agreed that ‘a possible EU financial programme supporting sports activities for the years 
2012 to 2013 ought to have a limited number of priorities’ (Council of the European Union 2010: 10). 
The request for limited issue priorities by the ministers was also underpinned by the budgetary 
limitation that had been pointed out by the IAB. 
As a result of the existing institutional constraints, the proposed two-year sport programme was 
consequently withdrawn by DG EAC and replaced with a political communication without a spending 
scheme for 2012-2013 (European Commission 2011b). The IAB subsequently approved the revised 
proposal and the Communication on Developing European Dimension in Sport (European 
Commission 2011a) was adopted on 18 January 2011. The communication prioritised a number of 
policy issues with related policy actions. As a response to the communication, the Council also 
adopted a resolution on a three-year EU work plan for sport for the period from 2011 up to mid-
2014 underlining the priorities of the member states (Council of the European Union 2011). These 
two policy documents officially established a policy framework incorporating prioritised issues and 
related policy actions and became the backbone of EU sport policy (Geeraert 2016). 
In agenda-setting terms, the two-year sport programme proposed by DG EAC failed to gain the 
attention of policy actors beyond DG EAC due to institutional constraints. Therefore, issue expansion 
did not take place from the low politics route of the Commission to the high politics route involving 
the Council and the EP. In fact, the career of the issue was short-lived and did not even survive 
internally within the Commission due to the opposition of the IAB. DG EAC realised that sport, as a 
standalone policy issue, failed to mobilise the support of enough actors to incorporate an adequate 
funding stream onto the decision agenda. Internally, the IAB clearly pointed out that ‘the mere fact 
of a new Treaty basis for sport is an important but not sufficient justification for a proposal of a two-
year EU sport programme at this point in time’ (European Commission 2011b: 5, emphasis added). 
The discussion by the sport ministers in their Council meeting was indicative of an interest (i.e. it was 
on the political agenda), but not of enough support for the proposal (i.e. it was not on the decision 
agenda). Therefore, the challenge for DG EAC was now to construct a strategy that could secure 
enough institutional support for a sport programme funded in the upcoming financial budget for the 
period of 2014-2020, on which preparatory work had already been underway since mid-2010 
(European Commission 2011c).  
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Such a strategy was needed to arouse the attention of EU policy actors with a view to overcome 
blockages to issue expansion within the Commission, but also to expand the issue to the agenda 
under the high politics route. In theoretical terms, the framing of sport had to be adjusted in order 
to overcome the institutional constraints that were evident after the first attempt.  
 
STAGE 2: A STRATEGIC FRAMING OF SPORT FOR ISSUE EXPANSION AND AGENDA ENTRANCE 
Learning from its original failure of securing funding for sport, DG EAC devised a twofold strategy to 
adjust its position in line with the broader institutional framework of the post-Lisbon era. The 
strategy was based upon two components: the reframing of sport for issue expansion and the 
integration of sport into a larger spending programme for the purposes of agenda simplification. 
Firstly, the framing of sport was adjusted in line with the broader discursive context related to the 
Europe 2020 agenda. DG EAC developed a new issue definition in which sport was successfully 
framed with a convincing link between the EU’s economic problems and sport as a potential 
solution. In doing so, DG EAC not only managed to overcome the original internal opposition within 
the Commission but also attracted the attention of the Council and the EP. Gaining the interest of 
the Council and the EP was significant because it allowed the expansion of the decision agenda to 
include sport and paved the way for a favourable adoption. The second aspect of the strategy was to 
overcome institutional constraints through simplification. This meant using an existing programme 
to incorporate the sport initiatives, rather than creating a specific programme for sport. Here, we 
will see how Erasmus+ was chosen by DG EAC in order to gain the approval of other policy actors. 
Before moving to the analysis of this twofold strategy, we provide a brief contextual look at the EU’s 
Agenda 2020 strategy and the 2014-2020 MFF. 
Devised by the Commission, the Europe 2020 strategy aims to turn the EU into a smart, sustainable, 
and inclusive economy that delivers high levels of employment, productivity and social cohesion 
(European Commission 2010). The priorities of the strategy consequently are ‘smart growth’ by 
developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation, ‘sustainable growth’ by promoting a 
more resource efficient and competitive economy and ‘inclusive growth’ by fostering a high-
employment economy (European Commission 2010: 3). There are a number of headline economic 
targets set as a part of the strategy representing an overall view of where the Commission wants to 
see the EU on key parameters by 2020. The then-27 Heads of State and Government approved the 
Europe 2020 strategy in June 2010 (European Council 2010) and the member states in conjunction 
with the Commission have been working on the implementation since then.  
Acknowledging that the success of the strategy would depend upon collective effort, the 
Commission decided to mobilise ‘all EU policies’ to pursue the strategy’s objectives (European 
Commission 2010: 18). Subsequently, all programmes through which EU policies are implemented 
have also been redesigned to ensure their outputs and impacts support the key priorities of the 
strategy (European Commission 2011d). Additionally, with a view to improving EU financial 
efficiency, the Commission initiated a simplification process (European Commission 2012). The 
simplification aims to streamline spending programmes of the budget and to reduce the 
administration burden and cost for beneficiaries of funds. To achieve these objectives, the 
Commission agreed to rationalise EU programmes under the MFF by reducing the number of 
spending programmes and moving towards more integrated ones covering several policy areas 
(European Commission 2012).  
It is against this backdrop of the Agenda 2020 and the effort to rationalise spending that DG EAC had 
to act in order to secure a funding programme to implement EU sport policy. The initial steps of this 
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second attempt were taken by the Commission with the publication in 2011 of a political 
communication to the Council and the Parliament on the future of EU sport policy (European 
Commission 2011a). This Communication was the first official policy document that presented the 
reframing of sport as contributing to the broader economic objectives of the EU under the Europe 
2020 strategy. The document carefully articulated a link between sport and those broader economic 
goals at European level, in particular to turn the EU into a smart, sustainable and inclusive economy 
delivering high levels of employment, productivity and social cohesion. DG EAC claimed that in the 
field of sport,  
EU action also contributes to the overall goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy by 
improving employability and mobility, notably through actions promoting social 
inclusion in and through sport, education and training (including through the 
European Qualifications Framework) and European guidelines for physical activity 
(European Commission 2011a: 3).  
The economic dimension of the sport sector was also underlined to illustrate directly its potential to 
contribute to economic growth in Europe:  
Sport represents a large and fast-growing sector of the economy and makes an 
important contribution to growth and jobs, with value added and employment 
effects exceeding average growth rates. Around 2% of global GDP is generated by 
the sport sector. Major sport events and competitions provide strong potential for 
increased development of tourism in Europe. Sport is thus a contributor to the 
Europe 2020 strategy (European Commission 2011a: 8). 
Thus, while the objectives of a sport programme were still the same, DG EAC framed the idea in a 
completely different way in order to fit ongoing broader policy discourses concerned with economic 
growth. This reframing of the issue of sport succeeded in gaining the attention of the Council and the 
EP. Additionally, through the Communication, DG EAC also hoped to spark political declarations from 
the Parliament and the Council with a view to using them in internal Commission discussions on the 
need for a sport programme (interview, Commission official, 16 May 2014).  
First, it was the Council who endorsed the role of sport for the Europe 2020 strategy by 
acknowledging that ‘sport can contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the Europe 2020 
strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ (Council of the European Union 2011: 1). In 
addition, the Council invited both the member states and the Commission to be bolder in their 
arguments on the contribution of sport to EU’s economy: 
[member states and the Commission should promote] better recognition of the 
contribution of sport to the overall goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy given the 
sector's strong potential to contribute to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth 
and new jobs and considering its positive effects on social inclusion, education and 
training as well as public health and active ageing (Council of the European Union 
2011: 3).  
Then, the EP welcomed the communication and recognised the potential of sport to help achieve the 
EU’s strategic objectives due to its educational and cultural values and as a vector of integration 
linked to social cohesion (European Parliament 2011). The EP also explicitly urged the Commission to 
‘propose a dedicated and ambitious budget for sport policy under the future MFF’ (European 
Parliament 2011: 8). Moreover, in these documents the idea of a sport programme gathered the 
institutional support it needed. Both the Council and the Parliament encouraged the Commission to 
go ahead and draft a new proposal for a sport programme (Council of the European Union 2011; 
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European Parliament 2011). This was a clear signal that both institutions were ready to receive it 
onto their decision agenda. 
The second part of DG EAC’s two-fold strategy was to integrate sport as a sub-programme under a 
broader and existing programme, Erasmus+, in order to overcome internally the constraints caused 
by the simplification agenda of the Commission (European Commission 2012). This largely meant 
recognising that ‘there was no appetite inside the Commission to have a separate programme for 
sport’ since the Commission’s general strategy was to rationalise its programmes (interview, 
Commission official, 17 June 2014). Therefore, senior officials in DG EAC made a strategic decision: 
To hide sport within a larger programme, rather than having a programme on its own.  
That was a strategic decision of senior management, and I think they were right. I 
wasn’t very happy when it happened [because] I wanted something separate 
because sport is so different […] We have much more flexibility now with this small 
programme. You lose visibility perhaps, but you get flexibility and in the end you are 
kind of under the umbrella of something which protects you (interview, Commission 
official, 16 May 2014). 
The rationale for this strategic decision was to ensure that sport was shielded as part of a larger and 
quite popular programme because there were wider negative trends towards more spending at EU 
level, as explained by this Commission official:  
We made a conscious decision of not going with a separate programme for sport, 
and we packaged it within Erasmus+. I think that was the key because you are 
navigating very difficult straits in this political climate. One, of euroscepticism. Two, 
financial difficulties for absolutely everybody. If you try to navigate these straits with 
a little ship called ‘Sports Programme’, you will get blown out of the water in no 
time. So we packaged it on the bigger sort of ocean tanker called Erasmus+ 
(interview, Commission official, 12 May 2014). 
With this proposal, DG EAC finally received a positive assessment on the Commission’s internal 
impact assessment board (European Commission 2011c: 5), which also acknowledged the main 
benefit of including sport in Erasmus+ was mainly ‘administrative efficiency’ (European Commission 
2011c: 36). DG EAC were thus successful in justifying sport’s potential ability to contribute to Europe 
2020 goals (issue framing) and negotiating institutional constraints by finding a suitable policy 
framework. DG EAC was then free to submit a proposal for the consideration of the EP and the 
Council.  
Having adapted to the broader institutional conditions, DG EAC proceeded to draft a legislative 
proposal for Erasmus+. Sport was given a separate chapter in the Commission’s proposal for 
Erasmus+, and two articles (11 and 12) which state specific objectives and activities (European 
Commission 2011e). Following the EU’s ordinary legislative procedure, once the proposal is drafted 
and submitted, it is outside the Commission’s hands and on the decision agenda of both the Council 
and the EP. Both the Council (2012a, 2012b) and the EP (2012) tabled amendments to the proposal 
and entered ‘trilogue’ negotiations throughout 2013 (European Parliament 2013: 4). There was very 
little contestation of the inclusion of sport (Council of the European Union 2013: 9–10; European 
Parliament 2013: 2–6). A couple of member states, most vocally Sweden, were opposed to including 
sport in Erasmus+ - a resistance based on strict subsidiarity concerns, i.e. that sport was best dealt 
with at the national level - but the vast majority were in favour and the resisting member states 
ultimately let go of their reservations, not least because the decision would be adopted under 
qualified majority (interview, member state representative, Working Party level, 21 May 2014).  
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The representatives of the member states working in the Council were finally happy to see the 
Commission’s proposal adopted. They realised the chosen frame was probably the correct one for it 
allowed successful agenda inclusion and consequent policy adoption:  
The general thing was that we were all very happy that sport was going to be getting 
its own dedicated budget as part of Erasmus+. Of course we would have liked it to 
be more. But I think there was recognition that even just getting this was a first, 
good step (interview, member state representative, Working Party level, 20 May 
2014). 
Moreover, a substantial majority of the EP’s Committee on Culture and Education favoured sport’s 
inclusion in Erasmus+ (European Parliament 2012; interviews with MEPs, June 4 and 11). 
Accordingly, the interinstitutional negotiations on the sporting aspects of Erasmus+ reveal much 
consensus. The end result of a long process was that sport was finally accepted as an area where the 
EU funds could be legitimately spent. Sport, within Erasmus+, has been placed under the MFF’s 
Heading 1A (Competitiveness for Growth and Jobs) within the main heading of Smart and Inclusive 
Growth. 
 
CONCLUSION  
This article has analysed how sport came to be included as part of the Erasmus+ programme, hence 
adopting the first budgetary line to implement EU sport policy under Article 165 TFEU. This process 
has followed the expected agenda dynamics outlined in our conceptual framework in relation to 
issue framing, institutional constraints and issue expansion. DG EAC’s initial proposal for a single 
programme for sport was internally blocked within the Commission, mostly due to the IAB’s 
concerns over financial constraints of the EU budget. Seeking to overcome that constraint, DG EAC 
re-strategised (i.e. reframed the proposal), strengthening the link between sport and the EU’s larger 
economic priorities and gave up on a single programme in favour of inclusion within a larger 
framework. Through institutional manoeuvring within the Commission, a viable institutional 
framework was located in Erasmus+. Crucially, the proposed sport actions were successfully linked 
to the priorities of Europe 2020, hence linking the sport chapter to a wider frame of already 
accepted EU policy objectives. Once the conflict was formally expanded beyond the Commission, the 
Council and the EP each sought to frame the content of the sport chapter according to their 
respective priorities. 
In the vein of Princen (2011: 929) the agenda-setting strategies of DG EAC in order to ‘mobilise 
supporters’ and ‘arouse interest’ to induce conflict expansion focused on ‘claiming authority’ by 
defining (framing) sport as a vehicle for promoting economic development. This further underlines 
how an ‘economised approach’ (Princen 2011: 937) to agenda-setting remains a viable approach in 
the EU, especially in ‘vulnerable’ policy areas (Princen 2011: 939). It also indicates the importance of 
issue framing as a variable in predicting success in EU agenda-setting. 
Attention and visibility are key terms in agenda-setting theory and, generally speaking, agenda-
setting posits that more visibility is beneficial to promote an issue within the agenda in order to 
make a decision. Our research both supports and problematises this assumption. Earlier we noted 
how the Commission’s decision to deliberately frame sport as a small chapter within a larger 
programme both increased and lowered the visibility of sport. This must be understood as a 
deliberately low-political agenda-setting strategy caused by high-politics (Princen and Rhinard 2006). 
Thus, the choice for Erasmus+ rather than a single programme was a consequence of the 
Commission’s internal bureaucratic politics (Hartlapp, Metz and Rauh 2013), i.e. the strategy of 
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moving towards a streamlining of programmes, while also reflecting the uncertainty that revolved 
around the new MFF and the dominant politics of austerity. This meant DG EAC could not ‘speak 
with big words’ (Princen 2011) to arouse interest for sport’s funding. Rather, the strategy chosen to 
achieve a funding stream for sport included deliberately shying away from seeking visibility for sport 
and ‘hiding’ sports funding within a larger programme. As Princen (2011) suggests, this means that 
EU agenda-setting requires mixing diverse strategies – not all forms of visibility are equally beneficial 
when promoting an issue. In more generic terms, this also suggests that actors are heavily restrained 
by ongoing policy preferences when framing policy initiatives. Most importantly, this empirically 
supports Princen’s (2011: 940) claim that in areas where the EU is a ‘newcomer’, such as sport, 
building credibility is crucial, and accordingly agenda-setting strategies will tend to be ‘indirect’, with 
the most likely strategy being to link issues to more established programmes. DG EAC successfully 
linking sport to an ‘ocean tanker’ such as Erasmus+ represents a clear validation of this proposition.  
Ultimately, our case presents an interesting dynamic whereby a low profile in the wider political 
agenda helped to develop EU sport policy, another instance of integration by stealth (Mény 2014). 
This result was strongly driven by the politics of austerity and the financial crisis which necessitated a 
low-political approach. Unexpectedly, the outcome of the high-political MFF negotiations later 
benefited sport’s agenda-expansion. This further emphasises how ‘low’ and ‘high’ dynamics usually 
intersect in shaping outcomes (Princen and Rhinard 2006).  
It is further worth considering the limits of agenda-setting as a conceptual framework, in particular 
with regard to the risk of conceptual overstretch when applying a set of categories to a new case 
(Sartori 1970, 1991). At the most basic level, agenda-setting deals with the question of why certain 
issues become part of the political agenda while others do not (Princen 2012). Sport’s inclusion in 
Erasmus+, as a measurable and tangible new budgetary output, represents a rather unambiguous 
instance of policy change and agenda-expansion (Princen 2013: 866). At the same time, it is worth 
highlighting that Erasmus+ does not signify ‘radical’ change in the direction of EU sport policy in the 
same way as, say, the Bosman case represented in the pre-Lisbon era (García 2007). Within the 
context of punctuated equilibrium theory, to which agenda-setting theory is deeply linked (Princen 
2013), the post-Lisbon era of EU sport policy is arguably best characterised by incremental change 
insofar as ‘EU sport policy’ at large has not been subject to major reframing but has mostly been 
subject to agenda-shaping (Tallberg 2003). Empirical studies of EU agenda-setting have, however, 
tended to focus on ‘radical’ instances of policy-change, such as the establishment of hedge fund 
regulation following the subprime crisis (Moschella 2011). 
The question, then, is whether or not agenda-setting as a conceptual framework stands to lose 
analytical clarity – of being stretched – by the inclusion of cases like this, which explore the dynamics 
of an already established agenda. We would argue quite the opposite. EU agenda-setting remains at 
a research stage where extension is to be supported and, moreover, that while scholarly practice has 
tended to focus on ex post examinations of ‘radical’ decisions, more research into incremental 
processes are necessary and warranted in order to achieve a broader understanding of EU agenda-
setting dynamics. 
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APPENDIX  
Table 1. Interview sample 
Date Affiliation Place, type 
05-02-2014 
 
Department of Culture, Youth, Media and Sport, Flemish 
Communities, Belgium  
Over phone  
24-04-2014 
 
Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport, Ireland  Over phone 
02-05-2014  
 
Cyprus Sports Organisation Brussels, direct 
07-05-2014 
 
Ministry of Culture, Denmark Copenhagen, direct 
08-05-2014 
 
Ministry of Culture, Denmark Copenhagen, direct 
12-05-2014 European Commission, DG Education and Culture 
 
Brussels, direct 
14-05-2014 
 
Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU Brussels, direct 
15-05-2014 
 
European Commission, DG Education and Culture Brussels, direct 
16-05-2014 
 
European Commission, DG Education and Culture Brussels, direct 
20-05-2014 
 
Permanent Representation of Ireland to the EU Brussels, direct 
20-05-2014 
 
Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport, Ireland Brussels, direct 
21-05-2014 
 
Ministry of Human Resources, Hungary Brussels, direct 
21-05-2014 
 
Department of Physical Education and Sports, Republic of 
Lithuania 
Brussels, direct  
02-06-2014 
 
Department of Culture, Youth, Media and Sport, Flemish 
Communities, Belgium  
Brussels, direct 
03-06-2014 
 
Anonymous Brussels, direct 
04-06-2014 Member of European Parliament, European People’s Party, 
Germany 
Brussels, direct 
11-06-2014 
 
Member of European Parliament, European Conservatives 
and Reformists Group, UK 
Brussels, direct 
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Date Affiliation Place, type 
12-06-2014 Permanent Representation of Spain to the EU Brussels, direct 
13-06-2014 
 
Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 
Brussels 
Brussels, direct 
17-06-2014 
 
European Commission, DG Education and Culture Brussels, direct 
20-06-2014  
 
Permanent Representation of Belgium to the EU Brussels, direct 
23-06-2014 Assistant to MEP Brussels, direct 
01-07-2014 
 
Permanent Representation of Denmark to the EU Brussels, direct 
14-07-2014 
 
Ministry of Sport and Tourism, Department of Strategy and 
International Cooperation, Poland 
Brussels, direct 
16-07-2014 
 
European Commission, DG Education and Culture Brussels, direct 
 
 
 
